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In Gillis v. State, 333 Md. 69,
633 A.2d 888 (1993), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution did not
preclude prosecution in Maryland
of a defendant who had previously
been acquitted in another state. In
so holding, the court of appeals
determined that an acquittal in one
state invokes no constitutional im-
pediment to a subsequent Mary-
land prosecution for the same crime.
Therefore, neither doublejeopardy
principles nor the Full Faith and
Credit Clause will bar such a sub-
sequent proceeding in this state.
The petitioner, Ronald Gillis,
was tried for the murder of Byron
Parker in the Superior Court of
Kent County, Delaware, and was
acquitted of the charge in April,
1990. In November, 1990, the
body of Byron Parker was found in
Maryland and Gillis was subse-
quently charged in Maryland with
murder. After the petitioner's mo-
tion to dismiss the Maryland charge
was denied by the trial court, he
appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland. Prior to that
court's consideration of the ruling,
the court of appeals granted certio-
rari to decide whether the Mary-
land prosecution could continue
without violating the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.
Before addressing the
petitioner's full faith and credit
challenge, the court of appeals re-
viewed double jeopardy principles
regarding successive prosecutions
by different sovereigns for the same
crime. Gillis, 333 Md. at 73, 633
A.2d at 890. The court empha-
sized that under the "dual sover-
eignty" doctrine, separate sover-
eigns with differing authorities are
each permitted to prosecute an in-
dividual for the same crime if that
individual's conduct violated each
sovereign's laws. Id. (citingAbbate
v. US., 359 U.S. 187 (1959);
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121
(1959)). The court of appeals
pointed out that when a defendant
violates the laws of two different
sovereigns by a single act, that
defendant has committed two dis-
tinct offenses. Gillis, 333 Md. at
74, 633 A.2d at 890 (citing Heath
v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985)).
Therefore, when an individual
breaks the laws of two sovereigns,
"it cannot be truly averred that the
offender has been twice punished
for the same offence [sic]; but only
that by one act he has committed
two offences [sic], for each ofwhich
he is justly punishable." Id.
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The court of appeals further
relied upon the decision in Heath
to emphasize each state's strong
interest in enforcing its own laws.
Id. at 75. The court stated that the
mere enforcement of one state's
laws will not satisfy the interest of
another state in punishing viola-
tors of its own laws. Gillis, 333
Md.at75,633A.2dat891. While
acknowledging that the Supreme
Court in Heath did not address the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, but
rather the dual sovereignty prin-
ciple, the court of appeals never-
theless viewed the Heath rationale
as equally applicable to the
Petitioner's full faith and credit
challenge. Id.
Recognizing that the law is
well-settled in Maryland regarding
the invalidity of a double jeopardy
challenge to a Maryland prosecu-
tion subsequent to acquittal in an-
other state, the court turned to
Petitioner's full faith and credit
argument. Id. at 76, 633 A.2d at
891. The court began by stating
that the purpose of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the Constitu-
tion is "to require a state court to
recognize judgments of courts of
other states." Id. (quoting
Weinberg v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 299 Md. 225, 234, 473
A.2d22,27(1984)). However,the
court stressed that it is unclear
whether or not this clause even
applies to criminal proceedings.
Id. at 77, 633 A.2d at 892. While
noting that the Supreme Court has
never addressed the full faith and
credit issue in relation to succes-
sive state prosecutions, the court
of appeals relied upon Turley v.
Wyrick, 554 F.2d 840 (8th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1033
(1978), a United States Court of
Appeals decision, to determine that
even if the clause does apply to the
case at bar, the murder acquittal in
Delaware has no impact upon a
prosecution for murder in Mary-
land. Gillis, 333 Md. at 77-78,
633 A.2d at 892.
In Turley, the defendant was
acquitted in federal court of a fed-
eral bank robbery charge, and sub-
sequently attempted to have the
state robbery charge dismissed. Id.
When the motion was denied, the
Eighth Circuit considered the
defendant's habeas challenge to the
denial of his motion to dismiss and
determined that no denial of full
faith and credit had occurred. Id.
at 78, 633 A.2dat 892. The Court
of Appeals of Maryland found per-
suasive the rationale in Turley that
the federal judgment only acquit-
ted the defendant of violating fed-
eral law and did not constitute a
determination that state law had
not been violated. Id.
The court then rejected Gillis's
argument that the Delaware judg-
ment established that he did not
commit the murder and thus pre-
cluded Maryland from relitigating
the issue. Id. The court reached
this conclusion notwithstanding
that, under full faith and credit,
courts must give the same preclu-
sive effect to another state's judg-
ment "that the judgment would
receive in the state from which it
emerged." Id. (citing Underwrit-
ers Nat 'I Assurance Co. v. North
Carolina Life & Acc., 455 U.S.
691 (1982)). The court reasoned
that regardless of that principle, a
party who was never afforded the
opportunity to be heard on a par-
ticular cause of action will not be
precluded from ever litigating that
issue. 1d. Because Maryland had
not yet been given the opportunity
to determine whether Gillis vio-
lated its criminal laws, the court of
appeals determined that the State
should not be denied such an op-
portunity because of a "misplaced
application of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause." Id. at 79, 633
A.2d at 893.
The court found similarly
unpersuasive the Petitioner's reli-
ance on Farmland Dairies v. Bar-
ber, 65 N.Y.2d 51, 478 N.E.2d
1314 (1985), in which the Court of
Appeals of New York held that a
condition contained in a New Jer-
sey criminal judgment which stated
that the judgment may not be used
in any pending or future civil pro-
ceeding must be recognized and
thus could not be used in a subse-
quent New York administrative
proceeding. Gillis, 333 Md. at 80,
633 A.2d at 893. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland determined
that Farmland Dairies was inap-
plicable to Petitioner's situation,
in which the court was being asked
to accept Delaware's acquittal of a
defendant as a conclusive determi-
nation that the Petitioner did not
violate any of Maryland's laws,
rather than to determine the effect
of a condition in a criminal judg-
ment on a later civil proceeding.
Id.
The court strengthened its de-
termination by referring to previ-
ous cases in which it had applied
collateral estoppel principles. The
court of appeals first recognized
that collateral estoppel mandates
that when an issue of fact has been
determined by a final judgment,
that issue cannot be relitigated later
by the same parties. Id. at 80, 633
A.2d at 893 (citing Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970)).
The court then noted that in
instances in which it had addressed
the impact of collateral estoppel on
successive prosecutions of the same
defendant by different sovereigns,
it had refused to apply such estop-
pel when different parties were
adverse to the defendant. Id. at 81,
633 A.2dat 894. The court stressed
that Maryland would similarly not
be estopped from prosecuting the
Petitioner under its own laws, not-
withstanding his full faith and credit
challenge. Id. In holding that the
Maryland prosecution would be
allowed to continue, the court stated
that "[u]sing the Full Faith and
Credit Clause so as to deny [Mary-
land] its power to enforce its crimi-
nal laws because [Delaware] has
won the race to the courthouse
would be a shocking.. .deprivation
of the historic right and obligation
of the States to maintain peace and
order...." ld. at 83, 633 A.2d at
895 (quoting Heath, 474 U.S. at
93).
The court of appeals also noted
that it was questionable whether
Delaware ever actually had sub-
ject matter jurisdiction to pros-
ecute the Petitioner for the murder
of Byron Parker, whose body was
later found in Maryland. Id. at 82,
633 A.2dat894. The court stressed
that if one state did not have juris-
diction to render judgment on a
defendant, such state's judgment
need not be given full faith and
credit in a subsequent prosecution
in the Maryland courts. Id. (citing
UnderwritersNat 'lAssurance Co.,
455 U.S. at 704-05).
In Gillis v. State, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland determined
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
will not bar a subsequent Mary-
land prosecution following a
defendant's prior acquittal of the
same crime in another state. This
determination bolsters the strength
of the "dual sovereignty" prin-
ciple in Maryland and makes it
clear that neither a full faith and
credit challenge nor a double jeop-
ardy challenge is likely to be suc-
cess ful in barring successive crimi-
nal prosecutions in this state.
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